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Advanced modalizing de dicto and de re1 
JOHN DIVERS AND JOHN J. PARRY 
 
Abstract 
/HZLV¶(1968, 1986) analysis of modality faces a problem in that it appears to confer unintended 
truth values to certain modal claims about the pluriverse: e.g. µIt is possible that there are many 
ZRUOGV¶ is false when we expect truth. This is the problem of advanced modalizing. Divers 
(1999, 2002) presents a principled solution to this problem by treating modal modifiers as 
semantically redundant in some such cases. However, this semantic move does not deal 
adequately with advanced de re modal claims. Here, we motivate and detail a comprehensive 
semantics (a la Lewis 1968) for advanced modalizing de dicto and de re. The generalized 
semantic feature of the initial solution is not redundancy but absence from counterpart-theoretic 
translations of world-constrictions. 
  
1. Advanced modalizing and redundancy  
The problem of advanced modalizing is how the Lewisian theorist of modality is to deal with 
the modal modification of the theses of counterpart theory (Lewis 1968) and of genuine modal 
realism (Lewis 1986). Take the Lewis 1986 conception of unrestricted quantification as ranging 
over the whole pluriverse and read the following quantificational claims as so unrestricted: 
µ7KHUHDUHPDQ\ZRUOGV¶, µThere are transworld sets¶, µThere are perfectly natural properties¶ 
etc. Now modify the claims, so understood, with expressions of possibility to produce: µ7KHUH
FRXOGEHPDQ\ZRUOGV¶, µIt is possible that there are transworld sets¶, µThere might be perfectly 
QDWXUDO SURSHUWLHV¶ HWF. Now apply to these modal claims the counterpart-theoretic 
interpretation of Lewis 1968, and the result is, by genuine modal realist lights, falsehood when 
you would expect (given other Lewisian pronouncements) truth. Thus, for example in claiming 
the possibility of what she takes to be categorically the case ± µthere could be many worlds¶ ± 
the Lewisian is rendered by the 1968 interpretation as speaking the falsehood that µthere is a 
world within which there are many worlds¶.2 The root of the problem is as follows. The 1968 
interpretation forces the Lewisian to interpret all claims that are regimentable in quantified 
modal logic, whether in the modal fragment or not, as intra-world claims: claims about what is 
the case in the actual world, or in some worlds, or in all worlds. But that constriction is 
reflexively uncharitable.  So what is to be done? 
'LYHUV¶(1999, 2002) contribution to the solution of the advanced modalizing problem 
is to suggest that the Lewisian may treat certain modal modifications of unrestricted 
quantificational contents as semantically redundant. Thus, if we begin with a sentence, 
                                               
1 The final published version of this paper (with minor editorial corrections and official pagination) is forthcoming 
in Analysis. 
2 See Appendix for all relevant formalizations. 
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µ׌ݔܣሺݔሻ¶ in which the wide scope quantification is read unrestrictedly, it is a self-charitable 
semantic option to interpret modal modifications as follows: 
(AP) µIt is possible that ሺ׌ݔܣሺݔሻሻ¶is true iff ׌ݔܣሺݔሻ 
(AN) µIt is necessary that ሺ׌ݔܣሺݔሻሻ¶ is true iff ׌ݔܣሺݔሻ 
(AI) µIt is impossible that ሺ׌ݔܣሺݔሻሻ¶ is true iff Not-׌ݔܣሺݔሻ 
(AC) µIt is contingent that ሺ׌ݔܣሺݔሻሻ¶ is true iff [׌ݔܣሺݔሻ and Not-׌ݔܣሺݔሻ] 
This redundancy interpretation produces felicitous results in a wide range of relevant cases ± 
for example: 
(AP1) µ3RVVLEO\ WKHUH DUH PDQ\ ZRUOGV¶ is true iff (unrestrictedly) there are many 
worlds (i.e. ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻ) 
 
2. The problem of advanced de re modals 
Jago (2016: 629±31) objects that the redundancy interpretation generates the wrong truth-
values (falsehood where we require truth) in other relevant cases. The cases in question are 
modalized comparatives of non-worldmates (say, Bill and Anna) ± for example: 
 (X) It is contingent that Anna is taller than Bill 
The two planks of the objection then are: (O1) that (X) is true, but (O2) (X) is not true under 
the redundancy interpretation, which produces the unsatisfiable truth-condition 
(ܴܾܽƬ൓ܴܾܽሻ.  
The first strategy for responding to this worry is to focus on (O1). In that case, it is 
important to emphasize that the primary question, given the nature of the bigger dialectic is 
whether a Lewisian really ought to accept the presented case for (O1).3 It is not obvious that 
Jago has taken that point since the case that he makes is for the truth of (X), and as follows. 
Anna and Bill are RUGLQDU\ KXPDQ EHLQJV ZLWK µregular human bodies, embedded within 
physical environments and subject to physical laws very much like our own¶ (Jago, 2016: 631). 
The suggestion is that the only difference between Anna and Bill, on one hand, and us, on the 
other, is that they do not inhabit the same world as one another. Accordingly, we should expect 
contingency to characterize comparative relations between them when it does so between us: 
but applying the redundancy interpretation, not so. However, it is not obvious that there is any 
supervenience principle that will support WKHDUJXPHQWDWLYHµDFFRUGLQJO\¶ here and to which 
the Lewisian is committed. Moreover, in the absence of any prior commitment to contingency 
in such a case, the Lewisian might attempt to take what is an admittedly odd non-contingency 
                                               
3 The point here is not to sway skeptics who are inclined to reject the Lewisian theory of modality on prior grounds. The point 
is to convince the reader that given the basic Lewisian theory of modality, advanced modalizing problems can be solved by 
deploying existing resources and without introducing any further problems. Or, at least, such would be a maximal solution 
within the remit. 
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in her theoretical stride here as she does in the case of unrestricted existence, the Lewisian 
being a necessitist in the sense of Williamson.4  In both cases the Lewisian might be unmoved 
by pleas, emerging from metaphysical intuition, about how the intrinsic natures of things 
compel a verdict of contingency in cases that neither everyday modalizing nor scientific 
modalizing anticipates: that is, cases in which we modally modify relational predications of 
individuals who are drawn without restriction from a plenitudinous pluriverse of 
spatiotemporally disjoint parts. However, we will not pursue that strategy here.5  Instead, we 
allow that the truth of (X) is something that, in the first instance at least, the Lewisian would 
rather accommodate and we accept on her behalf the burden of that accommodation. 
Accordingly, we adopt the second available strategy and focus on the second plank of the 
objection, (O2) above. Thus, we explain why the application of the simple redundancy 
interpretation is inappropriate in such cases and propose a felicitous alternative. 
 
3.  Preliminaries 
Let XVSXWDVLGHWZRXQIRUWXQDWHDVSHFWVRI-DJR¶VH[DPSOHWKDWpotentially weaken his case but 
which are also dispensable. Firstly, the choice of non-PRGDOUHODWLRQDOSUHGLFDWLRQµtaller than¶ 
is unfortunate. For such predications are problematic when they are applied to individuals who 
are supposed to stand (qua non-worldmates) in no spatiotemporal relations to one another 
(Divers 2014b). But other predications that are not so sensitive to spatiotemporal isolation 
could be substituted (µhappier than¶, µthe same colour as¶, etc.). Secondly, the example moots 
singular reference to non-actual individuals and that is also problematic given the metaphysics 
of genuine modal realism (see Divers 2002: 77-85). But we could just as easily consider de re 
modalizing that does not rely on singular reference to non-actuals, suggesting only that there 
exists human x and there exists human y such that the x and the y are modally thus and so. With 
their dispensability noted we shall let those features of the example stand: but we shall make a 
change in the form of a simplification that eliminates unnecessary complexity and length of 
formulas. Thus we focus on the crucial possibility claim, (X*) 
(X*) Possibly Bill is taller than Anna.  
Finally, and to locate more precisely our complaint, Jago is right about this much: if we apply, 
in the manner he envisages, the redundancy interpretation to (X**) we get falsehood where we 
are committed to finding truth ± thus: 
(X**) Bill is taller than Anna 
For, by hypothesis, we are committed to Anna being taller than Bill and are, thus, one step 
away from contradiction. 
                                               
4 See Williamson (2013: 16-27) and Divers (2014a).  
5 Just as Jago is very confident about what judgments we (or is it the Lewisian?) should make in recherché cases of de re 
modalizing about non-worldmates, so it is with Bigelow & Pargetter (1990: 192-93) in the case of counterfactuals about non-
worldmates. For discussion see Divers (2002: 96-98). 
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The crux of the matter is this: the de re modal (X*) has been treated as if it were 
appropriately regimented as a formula that has an expression of possibility in position of widest 
scope. That is why the familiar redundancy rule (AP), above, is supposed to apply. But this is 
not the Lewisian way. The Lewisian way is to regiment (X*), in its de re reading, as a formula 
that does not have an expression of possibility ± but rather, a quantifier ± in position of widest 
scope.  
The procedure envisaged by Lewis 1968 is to represent English sentences in the 
notation of pure quantified modal logic (QML) ± that is name-free QML ± and then apply the 
rules for translation into counterpart theory. Let us begin then with 
(X*)   Possibly Bill is taller than Anna 
The procedure for regimenting (X*) is to apply the Russellian method of descriptions and to 
register the familiar scope ambiguities discerned by Smullyan (1948). So, imagining that we 
associate appropriate definite descriptions witKµBill¶, µB*¶ and with µ$QQD¶, µ$¶, we have the 
two readings: 
(X*1) Possibly (the x that is the B* is taller than the y that is the A*) 
(X*2) The x that is the B* and the y that is the A* are such that possibly (x is taller 
than y). 
On the de dicto reading, (X*1), and as long as we choose felicitous, height-independent, 
descriptions, we get by Lewisian lights, truth ± for example, (LX*1):  
(LX*1) There is a world at which (the x that is the fastest ever runner is 
 taller than the y that is the longest ever jumper).6 
But on the de re reading we do uncover an advanced modalizing problem. For applying the 
Lewis (1968) rules for modal operators occurring within the scope of quantifiers, we obtain 
(LX*2): 
(LX*2) In the actual world there is an x that is the B* and there is a y that is the A* and 
there is a world w in which there is an x-counterpart, z, and there is a y-
counterpart, u, such that z is taller than u. 
One need not read very far along the regimentation to appreciate that it will often yield (by 
Lewisian lights) unwanted falsehood: all such claims are false when there is no actual x that is 
the B* or no actual y that is the A*. So the Lewis 1968 interpretation of de re modal claims 
does no better than it does in the interpretation of de dicto modal claims in the (then) unintended 
and unanticipated case where the quantifiers under modal modification are intended to be 
unrestricted in the first place. But that much is entirely predictable. We now elaborate on this 
point, bringing to the surface the general principles that ought to govern the search for a 
solution to advanced modalizing problems and then applying them to the de re case.  
                                               
6 We appeal here to intra-world superlatives, see footnote 6 for more detail. 
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Systematizing and generalizing, we conclude by presenting translation rules, in the style and 
scope of Lewis 1968, that offer a unified approach to advanced modalizing de dicto and de re.  
 
4. The intended limitations of Lewis 1968 noted and removed 
The 1968 interpretation of modal discourse is calculated to be charitable about most modal 
talk. That is to say, what is said by pre-philosophical modalizers: those knee-jerk actualists 
whom we want to treat as truth-tellers when they say, µthere are no talking donkeys but there 
are talkers and donkeys¶ etc. Swiftly, the effective move in securing such charity is the 
imposition of truth-conditions that are invariably world-constricted. There is then a further 
challenge for the Lewisian to meet and which was not addressed in Lewis (1968): that is the 
challenge of self-charity. There are lots of things that the Lewisian says by way of modalizing 
about the pluriverse (see Divers 1999: 219). Perhaps all such talk is, somehow, dispensable. 
But we believe that it is worth asking the question whether its truth can systematically 
accommodated and answer that this is so. Swiftly, again, the effective move in securing this 
kind of charity is the removal of world-constrictions on the truth-conditions stated in Lewis 
1968. The redundancy interpretation of de dicto modal claims was the result of doing just that. 
But what is projectable beyond that case to the de re is not (simple) UHGXQGDQF\DVSHU-DJR¶V
objection, but the removal of world-constrictions. The folk believe ± or do not disbelieve ± that 
their unrestricted quantification is world-constricted: in fact, actual-world-constricted. That 
feature of their beliefs is charitably respected when truth-conditions are given for the modal 
modification of quantifiers so intended. The Lewisians believe that their unrestricted 
quantification is not world-constricted. That feature of their beliefs should be charitably 
respected by giving truth-conditions for the modal modification of quantifiers so intended. This 
is an entirely principled approach to interpretation. Now let us consider what it yields when 
applied in the most natural and obvious way to (X*2): 
(X*2) The x that is the B* and the y that is the A* are such that possibly (x is taller 
than y). 
Where we had previously, with world-constriction 
(CX*2) In the actual world there is an x that is the B* and there is a y that is the A* and 
there is a world w in which there is an x-counterpart, z, and there is a y-
counterpart, u, and z is taller than u. 
we now have, removing all sources of world-constriction  
(AX*2) There is an x that is the B* and there is a y that is the A* and there is an x-
counterpart, z, and there is a y-counterpart, u, and z is taller than u.7 
                                               
7 Here we take the descriptive terms unanalysed for ease of exposition, but ultimately they will be expanded in the Russellian 
ǁĂǇĂŶĚŽƵƌĂƉƉĞŶĚŝǆƌƵůĞƐǁŝůůĂƉƉůǇ ?Ğ ?Ő ? ? ?the x that is the B* ? ŝƐ׌ݔሺܤכݔƬ׊ݕ൫ܤכݕ ـ ሺݕ ൌ ݔሻ൯ሻ. A referee raises the 
intriguing question of how we might treat advanced de re modal claims invoking superlatives  ? e.g.  ?Possibly Anna is taller 
ƚŚĂŶŝůůĂŶĚƚĂůůĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŶǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?. We reply that, on the face of things, it seems that when we quantify over all of the 
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And there ± thanks to plenitude and recombination ± we have the Lewisian truth. The move is 
simple: unconstrict wherever there was world-constriction. But note that in the above case we 
remove two world-constricting expressions. The first of these is the initial, widest scope, 
actual-world-constrictor of (CX*2). The second of these is the, inner, some-world restrictor 
µWKHUHLVDZRUOGZLQZKLFK«¶) that required the subsequently introduced counterparts to be 
worldmates.8 
In the Appendix we state and apply translation principles a la Lewis 1968 that we 
hypothesise to be adequate in order to solve advanced modalizing problems in general (which 
is to say, for advanced modalizing de dicto and de re).  
 
5. Word-free analyses (WFA) 
Finally, we deal with the apparent anticipation of, and objections to, DQDO\VHVLQVXFKDµworld-
IUHH¶ spirit. This involves applying, swiftly, elements of the justification already given and 
ZKLFKDSSHDUWREHDEVHQWIURP-DJR¶VDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHDGYDQFHGPRGDOL]LQJSUREOHPDWLF.  
Firstly, Jago (2016: 633-34) suggests that the following de dicto claim is a (prima facie) 
counterexample to the general adequacy of the world-free modal interpretations in general. He 
VWDWHVWKDWµby RUGLQDU\VWDQGDUGV¶ a truth is expressed by (17):  
(17) There could have been no penguins 
But a world-free analysis treats (17) as having the false content: 
(18) (Unrestrictedly:) there are no penguins. 
So, µ«this is bad news for the [WFA], for there is clearly some sense in which there might 
have been no SHQJXLQV¶ We respond as follows. It is indeed true that by ordinary standards 
(17) is true. It is indeed the case that a world-free interpretation (18) produces falsehood. But 
(18), qua world-free interpretation, is not the right (charitable) interpretation of (17), the modal 
modification of a restricted content if true. So what is required for a charitable interpretation 
of (17) is the application of the (1968) translation procedure to give (the formal analogue of): 
(19) There is a world in which there are no penguins.  
This is not an ad hoc solution. Rather, it is the principled respoQVHWRGLVFHUQLQJWKHµRUGLQDU\¶ 
conception of unrestricted quantification that must be read into (17) in order that it should 
express the truth that we detect. 
                                               
pluriverse many such superlative descriptions will fail to denote: there is no tallest human in the pluriverse. Subsequently, a 
la Russell, sentences taking such descriptions as subjects will turn out to be false  ? sentences such as  ?Possibly Anna is taller 
than Bill and tĂůůĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŶǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?. But this is not obviously a problem. If there is an intuition of truth it is tied to the 
presumption that the domain of quantification is world-constricted and no longer holds sway when that constriction is 
removed. And such superlatives have no special role to play in the (notional) denotation of possibilia by description. 
8 In fact the removal of the second restrictor is not required to produce a Lewisian truth in this particular case. But, as Jago 
(2014: 113) shows, the full range of cases cannot be handled by such partial deconstriction. 
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Secondly, Jago (2016: 634, 636-37) suggests that the Lewisian cannot, as it were, have 
it both ways. She cannot maintain, in full generality the commitment that truth simpliciter (for 
a token sentence) is truth relative to the world in which it is uttered, and that some of the things 
that she wants to assert (qua genuine modal realist) are true simpliciter while not being true 
relative to any world or worlds. We respond as follows. It is indeed true that no-one is entitled 
to this conjunction of claims. But we arH QRQSOXVVHG E\ -DJR¶V FODLP WKDW WKH /HZLVLDQ LV
committed to the first claim. What may be true, of course, is that when certain fragments of the 
language are under study ± in particular non-modal sub-languages ± then there will be no 
effective difference between truth simpliciter and truth at the world of utterance. But that falls 
far short of (commitment to) a general equivalence which is ± in any case, on the face of it ± 
perverse. Why would one think that truth-simpliciter were inevitably coincident with truth 
relative to any kind of index? But perversity aside, and even if a Lewisian were incautious 
enough to make this commitment, an opportunity to abandon it and gain a generalized solution 
to advanced modalizing problems in the process should be welcome. So, let it go hang! 
In conclusion, then, we offer a solution to the problems of advanced modalizing in the 
de re case. We hypothesize further that a general solution to these problems is codifiable in 
translation procedures that are just as general as those of Lewis (1968). We have also tried to 
show a solution in this word-free spirit is robust in the face of apparent objections.  
 
University of Leeds, UK 
j.divers@leeds.ac.uk 
j.j.parry@leeds.ac.uk  
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Appendix 
i. Lewis (1968) World-Constricted Translations of QML Formulas into those of 
Counterpart Theory9 
T1: The translation of ߮ is ߮ ? (߮ holds in the actual world); that is, in primitive 
notation, ׌ߚሺ׊ߙሺܫߙߚ ؠ ܣߙሻƬ߮ఉሻ. We then have the following recursive definition 
of ߮ఉ (߮ holds iQZRUOGȕ 
T2a: ߮ఉ is ߮, if ߮ is atomic 
T2b: ሺ൓߮ሻఉ is ൓߮ఉ  
T2c: ሺ߮Ƭ߰ሻఉ is ߮ఉƬ߰ఉ 
T2d: ሺ߮ ש ߰ሻఉ is ߮ఉ  ש ߰ఉ  
T2e: ሺ߮ ـ ߰ሻఉ is ߮ఉ  ـ  ߰ఉ 
T2f: ሺ߮ ؠ ߰ሻఉ is ߮ఉ  ؠ  ߰ఉ 
T2g: ሺ׊ܽ߮ሻఉ is ׊ܽሺܫܽߚ ـ  ߮ఉሻ 
T2h: ሺ׌ܽ߮ሻఉ is ׌ܽሺܫܽߚƬ߮ఉሻ 
T2i: ሺᇝ߮ܽଵ ǥ ܽ௡ሻఉ is ׊ߚଵ׊ߛଵ ǥ ׊ߛ௡൫ܹߚଵƬܫߛଵߚଵƬܥߛଵܽଵƬ ǥ Ƭܫߛ௡ߚଵƬܥߛ௡ܽ௡  ـ  ߮ఉభߛଵ ǥ ߛ௡൯ 
T2j: ሺ ? ߮ ଵܽ ǥ ܽ௡ሻఉ is ׌ߚଵ׌ߛଵ ǥ ׌ߛ௡൫ܹߚଵƬܫߛଵߚଵƬܥߛଵܽଵƬ ǥ Ƭܫߛ௡ߚଵƬܥߛ௡ܽ௡Ƭ߮ఉభߛଵ ǥ ߛ௡൯ 
 
,IZHWDNHWKHRUGLQDU\FODLP³7KHUHLVDQ)´DQGLWVde dicto and de re modalizations, then 
we get the following translations from QML to the Lewis (1968) interpretation: ሺ׌ݔܨݔሻ ?  ՞  ׌ݔሺܫݔ ?Ƭܨ ?ݔሻ ሺ׌ݔ  ?ܨݔሻ ?  ՞  ׌ݔሺܫݔ ?Ƭ׌ߚ׌ݕ൫ܹߚƬܫݕߚƬܥݕݔƬܨఉݕ൯ሻ ሺ ? ׌ݔܨݔሻ ?  ՞  ׌ߚሺܹߚƬ׌ݔ൫ܫݔߚƬܨఉݔ൯ሻ 
The de dicto modalization of ׌ݔܨݔ is entailed by T2j as a limit case where the modal 
operator has widest scope, meaning that counterparts are not invoked. In this case, the 
explicit rule for de dicto limit cases is: 
T2jĻ: ሺ ? ߮ሻ ? is ׌ߚሺܹߚƬ߮ఉሻ 
                                               
9 Adapted from Lewis (1968: 118) with operator symbols modified for consistency with this paper.  
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The following is a full list of canonical translations of the relevant claims in this paper on the 
rules of Lewis (1968): 
 
µ7KHUHDUHPDQ\ZRUOGV¶ ሺ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻሻ ?  ՞  ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܫݔ ?Ƭܫݕ ?ƬܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻሻ 
 
µ7KHUHFRXOGEHPDQ\ZRUOGV¶ ሺ ? ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻሻ ?  ՞  ׌ߚሺܹߚƬ׌ݔ׌ݕ൫ܫݔߚƬܫݕߚƬܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻ 
 
µAnna is taller than Bill¶ ሺ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺܣכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ܤכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻƬܴݔݕሻ ? ՞׌ݔ׌ݕሺܫݔ ?Ƭܫݕ ?ƬܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺሺܣכݖƬܫݖ ?ሻ  ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ሺܤכݖƬܫݖ ?ሻ  ـሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻƬܴݔݕሻሻ  
 
µPossibly, Bill is taller than Anna¶ ሺ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺܣכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ܤכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻƬ  ? ܴݕݔሻ ?  ՞׌ݔ׌ݕሺܫݔ ?Ƭܫݕ ?ƬܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺሺܣכݖƬܫݖ ?ሻ  ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ሺܤכݖƬܫݖ ?ሻ ـሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻƬ׌ߚሺܹߚƬ׌ݑ׌ݒሺܫݑߚƬܫݒߚƬܥݑݔƬܥݒݕƬܴݒݑሻሻሻሻ  
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ii. World-Free Translations of QML Formulas into those of Counterpart Theory10 
 
T1*: The translation of ߮ is ߮ (߮ holds unrestrictedly)11 
T2a*: ߮is ߮, if ߮ is atomic 
T2b*: ሺ൓߮ሻ is ൓߮ 
T2c*: ሺ߮Ƭ߰ሻ is ߮Ƭ߰ 
T2d*: ሺ߮ ש ߰ሻ is ߮ ש ߰ 
T2e*: ሺ߮ ـ ߰ሻ is ߮ ـ ߰ 
T2f*: ሺ߮ ؠ ߰ሻ is ߮ ؠ ߰ 
T2g*: ሺ׊ܽ߮ሻ is  ׊ܽ߮ 
T2h*: ሺ׌ܽ߮ሻ is ׌ܽ߮ 
T2i*: ሺᇝ߮ܽଵ ǥ ܽ௡ሻ is ׊ߛଵ ǥ ׊ߛ௡ሺܥߛଵܽଵƬ ǥ Ƭܥߛ௡ܽ௡  ـ ߮ߛଵ ǥ ߛ௡ሻ 
T2j*: ሺ ? ߮ ଵܽ ǥ ܽ௡ሻ is ׌ߛଵ ǥ ׌ߛ௡ሺܥߛଵܽଵƬ ǥ Ƭܥߛ௡ܽ௡Ƭ߮ߛଵ ǥ ߛ௡ሻ 
 
6RLIZHUHSHDWWKHWDNLQJRIWKHRUGLQDU\FODLP³7KHUHLVDQ)´DQGLWVde dicto and de re 
modalizations, then we get the following translations: ሺ׌ݔܨݔሻ  ՞  ׌ݔܨݔ ሺ׌ݔ  ?ܨݔሻ  ՞  ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܥݕݔƬܨݕሻ ሺ ? ׌ݔܨݔሻ  ՞  ׌ݔܨݔ 
The de dicto modalization of ׌ݔܨݔ is entailed by T2j* as a limit case where the modal 
operator has widest scope, meaning that counterparts are not invoked. In this case, the 
explicit rule for de dicto limit cases is: 
T2j*Ļ: ሺ ? ߮ሻ is ߮ 
These rules entail truth-yielding (by Lewisian lights) interpretations for the claims in 
Appendix (i) in the following ways: 
                                               
10 We note that a similar set of rules is presented by Marshall (2016) in the context of an anti-Lewisian argument that it is 
not our business to discuss here. But we note, further, that our rationale for implementing our rules does not leave us open 
to whatĞǀĞƌĐŚĂƌŐĞƐĨŽůůŽǁĨƌŽŵƉŽƐƚƵůĂƚŝŶŐ ?ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇ ?ŝŶŵŽĚĂůĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? 
11 We could, instead, give these rules whilst preserving the exact form of the Lewis 1968, giving schematic translations 
whereby each ߮ is relativised to a certain index, e.g., ߮௎. In this context, however, we contend that since the relativized 
index U is invariably the domain of all individuals, the suppression of this notation illustrates a more felicitous interpretation, 
whereby there is effectively no relativization taking place.  
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µ7KHUHDUHPDQ\ZRUOGV¶ ሺ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻሻ  ՞  ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻሻ 
 
µThere could be many worlds¶ ሺ ? ׌ݔ׌ݕ൫ܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻ൯ ՞  ׌ݔ׌ݕ൫ܹݔƬܹݕƬ൓ሺݔ ൌ ݕሻ൯ 
 
µ$QQDLVWDOOHUWKDQ%LOO¶ ሺ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺܣכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ܤכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻƬܴݔݕሻ ՞ ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺܣכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ܤכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻƬܴݔݕሻሻ 
 
µPossibly, Bill is taller than Anna¶ ሺ׌ݔ׌ݕሺܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺܣכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ܤכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ሻƬ  ? ܴݕݔሻ  ՞׌ݔ׌ݕ ቀܣכݔƬܤכݕƬ׊ݖ൫ሺܣכݖ ـ ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ൯Ƭ൫ܤכݖ ـ  ሺݖ ൌ ݕሻ൯ቁ Ƭ׌ݑ׌ݒሺܥݑݔƬܥݒݕƬܴݒݑሻሻ12 
  
                                               
12 For results and discussion of theorems and implications for various standard modal principles see Parry, J. J. (2017). 
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